We study reasoning in Levesque's logic of only knowing. In particular, we first prove that extending a decidable subset of first-order logic with the ability of reasoning about only knowing preserves decidability of reasoning, as long as quantifying-in is not allowed in the language, and define a general method for reasoning about only knowing in such a case. Then, we show that the problem of reasoning about only knowing in the propositional case lies at the second level of the polynomial hierarchy. Thus, it is as hard as reasoning in the majority of propositional formalisms for nonmonotonic reasoning, like default logic, circumscription, and autoepistemic logic, and it is easier than reasoning in propositional formalisms based on the minimal knowledge paradigm, which is strictly related to the notion of only knowing. Finally, we identify a syntactic restriction in which reasoning about only knowing is easier than in the general propositional case, and provide a specialized deduction method for such a restricted setting.
Introduction
Research in the formalization of commonsense reasoning through epistemic logics [21, 23, 18] has pointed out the need for providing systems (agents) with the ability of introspecting on their own knowledge and ignorance. To this aim, an epistemic closure assumption is generally adopted, which informally can be stated as follows: "the logical theory formalizing the agent is a complete specification of the agent's knowledge". As a consequence, any fact that is not logically implied by such a theory is assumed to be not known by the agent.
As shown in [18] , this paradigm underlies the vast majority of the logical formalizations of nonmonotonic reasoning. Roughly speaking, there exist two different ways to embed such a principle into a logic:
(i) by considering a nonmonotonic formalism, whose semantics implicitly realizes such a "closed" interpretation of the logical theory representing the agent's knowledge; (ii) by representing the closure assumption explicitly in the framework of a monotonic logic, suitably extending its syntax and semantics.
The first approach has been pursued in the definition of several modal formalizations of nonmonotonic reasoning, e.g. McDermott and Doyle's nonmonotonic modal logics [20] , Halpern and Moses' logic of minimal epistemic states [9] and Lifschitz's logic of minimal belief and negation as failure [19] . On the other hand, the second approach has been followed by Levesque [18] in the definition of the logic of only knowing.
The logic of only knowing is obtained by adding an "all-I-know" modal operator O to modal logic K45. Informally, such an interpretation of the modality O is obtained through a maximization of the set of successors of each world satisfying O-formulas.
There is a strict similarity between the interpretation of the modality O and the semantics of nonmonotonic modal logics. Let ϕ be a modal formula specifying the knowledge of the agent: in the logic of only knowing, satisfiability of the formula Oϕ in a world w requires maximization of the possible worlds connected to w and satisfying ϕ; an analogous kind of maximization is generally realized by the preference semantics of nonmonotonic modal logics, by choosing, among the models for ϕ, only the models having a "maximal" set of possible worlds, where such a notion of maximality changes according to the different proposals. In a nutshell, the logic of only knowing is a monotonic formalism, in which the modality O allows for an explicit representation of the epistemic closure assumption at the object level (i.e. in the language of the logic), whereas in nonmonotonic formalisms the closure assumption is a meta-level notion.
The studies investigating the relationship between only knowing and nonmonotonic logics [1] have stressed the analogies between the two approaches from an epistemological viewpoint. An analogous analysis from the computational viewpoint has not been pursued so far. Indeed, there exist several studies concerning the computational properties of nonmonotonic logics, in particular propositional nonmonotonic modal formalisms (e.g., [3, 5, 20, 22] ). On the other hand, the computational properties of only knowing in the propositional case have not been thoroughly investigated. The only related studies appearing agent.
in the literature concern a fragment of OL built upon a very restricted subclass of propositional formulas, for which satisfiability is tractable [15] , and a computational study of a framework in which only knowing is added to a formal model of limited reasoning [13] . Moreover, a lower bound for reasoning in the propositional fragment of OL (Σ p 2 ) is known, due to the fact that autoepistemic logic [21] can be embedded in polynomial time into OL.
The goal of the present work is to provide algorithms for computing satisfiability in the logic of only knowing. To this end, we exploit the similarity between this formalism and nonmonotonic modal logics, in order to identify a finite characterization of the models of a formula in the logic OL.
The main results of the paper concern both decidability and complexity of reasoning about only knowing. Specifically, we first prove that extending a decidable subset of first-order logic (without equality) with the ability of reasoning about only knowing preserves decidability of reasoning, as long as quantifying-in, i.e. the presence of modalities inside quantifiers, is not allowed. Moreover, we define a general method for computing satisfiability in OL without quantifying-in. To the best of our knowledge, such an algorithm is the first terminating procedure for reasoning about only knowing in any decidable fragment of first-order logic (e.g. in the full propositional fragment of OL).
Then, we show that the problem of reasoning about only knowing in the propositional case lies at the second level of the polynomial hierarchy. More precisely, satisfiability in the propositional fragment of OL is a Σ p 2 -complete problem. Thus, reasoning about only knowing is as hard as reasoning in the majority of propositional formalisms for nonmonotonic reasoning, like autoepistemic logic [22, 5] , default logic [5] , circumscription [4] , and several McDermott and Doyle's logics [20] . Moreover, reasoning about only knowing is easier (unless the polynomial hierarchy collapses) than reasoning in nonmonotonic modal formalisms based on the minimal knowledge paradigm [27] , like Halpern and Moses' logic of minimal epistemic states [2] , Lifschitz's logic MBNF [24] , and the moderately grounded version of autoepistemic logic [3] .
We also define an interesting syntactic restriction of the propositional fragment of OL in which deduction is easier than in the general case. Specifically, we identify a subset of formulas in OL for which the satisfiability (and validity) problem is P
NP
[O(log n)]-complete, i.e. can be reduced to a logarithmic number of propositional satisfiability problems. This case is particularly interesting, since it can be viewed as a generalization of the problem of answering epistemic queries to a propositional knowledge base [23, 6] .
In the following, we first briefly introduce the modal logic of only knowing OL. Then, in Section 3 we present a finite characterization of the models of a sentence in OL, which provides the basis for the definition of reasoning methods for OL. In Section 4 we define a deduction method for satisfiability (validity) in decidable fragments of OL, and analyze the computational properties of OL in the propositional fragment of OL; we also define a syntactic restriction of OL, showing that reasoning in this setting is easier than in the general case. Finally, in Section 5 we investigate the relationship between only knowing and the minimal knowledge paradigm, and conclude in Section 6.
The logic OL
In this section we briefly recall the formalization of only knowing [18] . We assume that the reader is familiar with the basic notions of modal logic. We recall that K45 denotes the modal logic interpreted on Kripke structures whose accessibility relation among worlds is transitive and euclidean, while modal logic KD45 imposes in addition that the relation be serial; finally, modal logic S5 also imposes reflexivity on the accessibility relation (see e.g. [10, 20] for more details).
We use L to denote the language of first-order logic without equality, i.e. L is the set of first-order sentences built in the usual way upon connectives ∧, ¬ (the symbols ∨, ⊃, ≡ are used as abbreviations), an existential quantifier, an infinite set of variables, an infinite set A of propositional symbols, an infinite set of predicate symbols of every arity, and an infinite set of function symbols. 2 We assume that A contains the symbols true, false. We call objective any sentence from L.
Following [18] , we interpret sentences from L with respect to a fixed, countably infinite interpretation domain ∆. As shown in [17] , imposing a countably infinite domain does not influence satisfiability/validity of first-order sentences without equality, i.e. the set of satisfiable sentences is the same as in classical first-order logic. In the following, we call interpretation a usual first-order interpretation for L over ∆. An interpretation is also called world. For each interpretation w, w(true) = TRUE and w(false) = FALSE. The evaluation w(ϕ) of a sentence ϕ in an interpretation w is defined in the usual way. We say that a sentence ϕ ∈ L is satisfiable if there exists an interpretation w such that w(ϕ) = TRUE (which we also denote as w |= ϕ).
Definition 1 We denote as L O the modal extension of L with the modalities K and O inductively defined as follows:
2 The assumption done in [18] that constants are rigid designators (i.e., in each interpretation, each constant denotes the same element of the interpretation domain) can be omitted here, since the case of quantifying-in is not dealt with in this paper. We also use L K to denote the analogous extension of L with the only modality K. We call O-sentence a sentence from L O of the form Oϕ. Notice that, with respect to [18] , we slightly change the language of the logic, using the modality K instead of B.
The semantics of a sentence ϕ ∈ L O is defined in terms of satisfiability in a structure (w, M ) where w is an interpretation (called initial world ) and M is a set of interpretations.
Definition 2 Let w be an interpretation on L, and let M be a set of such interpretations. We say that a sentence ϕ ∈ L O is satisfied in (w, M ), and write (w, M ) |= ϕ, iff the following conditions hold:
We say that ϕ ∈ L O is weakly OL-satisfiable if there exists (w, M ) such that (w, M ) |= ϕ. Since the initial world does not influence satisfiability of a sentence of the form Kϕ or Oϕ, we write M |= Kϕ (resp. M |= Oϕ) iff (w, M ) |= Kϕ (resp. (w, M ) |= Oϕ) for any interpretation w.
The above semantics is not actually the one originally proposed in [18] : in addition to the above rules, a pair (w, M ) must satisfy a maximality condition for the set M , as described below. However, as mentioned in [7] , the above, weaker notion of satisfiability is also meaningful.
In the following, T h(M ) denotes the set of sentences Kϕ such that ϕ ∈ L K and, for each w ∈ M , (w, M ) |= Kϕ. Given two sets of interpretations
Roughly speaking, the maximality condition prevents from the existence of models which agree on all basic beliefs, yet disagree on whay they only know [18, Section 2.2].
We say that a sentence ϕ ∈ L O is OL-valid iff ¬ϕ is not OL-satisfiable. In the next section we will prove that the notions of OL-satisfiability and weak OL-satisfiability of a sentence from L O coincide. Notice, however, that OLsatisfiability and weak OL-satisfiability for infinite theories are, in general, different (see [18, Section 2.4 
]).
As for reasoning in OL, we give the following definition.
Based on the above definition, we can immediately reduce reasoning to unsatisfiability in OL. 
Notice that the above semantics strictly relates the logic OL with modal logic K45, since there is a precise correspondence between the pairs (w, M ) used in the above definition and K45 models. We recall that, with respect to the satisfiability problem, a K45 model can be considered without loss of generality as a pair (w, M), where w is a world, M is a set of worlds (possibly empty), w is connected to all the worlds in M, the worlds in M are connected with each other (i.e. M is a universal S5 model) and no world in M is connected to w [20] (in the case of KD45 models, M is required to be non-empty). Thus, in the following we will refer to a pair (w, M ) as a K45 model whose S5 component is M . Notice also that, if Σ ∈ L K , then Σ is OL-satisfiable if and only if it is K45-satisfiable, which is shown by the fact that, if a K45 model (w, M ) satisfies such a Σ, then there exists a maximal set M equivalent to M , hence (w, M ) satisfies Σ.
Informally, the interpretation of the O modality is obtained through the maximization of the set of successors of each world satisfying an O-sentence. As pointed out e.g. in [14] , the meaning of an O-sentence Oϕ such that ϕ is nonmodal is intuitive, whereas it is more difficult to understand the semantics of an O-sentence with nested modalities. 
Characterizing OL-satisfiability
In this section we present a finite characterization of the models of a sentence Σ ∈ L O which is based on the use of partitions of modal sentences occurring in Σ. Similar techniques are used in several methods for reasoning in nonmonotonic modal logics (e.g. [5, 20, 3, 22, 2] ): in such methods, partitions of subformulas of a modal theory are generally used for providing a finite characterization of the epistemic states of the agent, which correspond to infinite modal theories. In fact, such partitions can also be used in order to provide a finite characterization of an S5 model. In particular, a partition satisfying certain properties identifies a particular S5 model M, by uniquely determining a non-modal theory (called the objective knowledge of M). M is then defined as the set of all interpretations satisfying such objective knowledge. Now, in order to check whether an O-sentence Oϕ is satisfied in a K45 model (w, M ), we exploit the possibility of expressing, by means of an objective sentence, the objective knowledge of the S5 component M of (w, M ). This allows us to establish whether ϕ is "all that is known" in the set of interpretations M .
We first introduce some preliminary definitions. Following [6] , we say that an occurrence of a sentence ψ in a sentence ϕ ∈ L O is strict if it is not in the scope of a modal operator. We also call modal atom a sentence of the form Kϕ or Oϕ, with ϕ ∈ L O , and call modal atoms of Σ (denoted by M A(Σ)) the set of modal atoms occurring in Σ.
Definition 9 Let Σ ∈ L O and let P, N be sets of modal atoms such that P ∪ N ⊇ M A(Σ) and P ∩ N = ∅. We denote with Σ| P,N the objective sentence obtained from Σ by substituting each strict occurrence in Σ of a sentence in P with true, and each strict occurrence in Σ of a sentence in N with false.
Notice that only the occurrences in Σ of modal atoms which are not within the scope of another modality are replaced; notice also that Σ| P,N is an objective sentence. Informally, the pair (P, N ) identifies a "guess" on the modal atoms from Σ, and Σ| P,N represents the "objective knowledge" implied by Σ under such a guess.
Definition 10 Let (P, N ) be a partition of M A(Σ).
Then, we denote with ob(P ) the following objective sentence:
Roughly speaking, the objective sentence ob(P ) represents the objective knowledge implied by the guess (P, N ) on the modal atoms belonging to P .
One possible partition of M A(Σ) is the following:
Definition 12 Let S be a set of modal atoms. We say that a set of interpretations M induces the partition (P, N ) on S if, for each modal atom Kϕ ∈ S, Kϕ ∈ P iff M |= Kϕ, and for each modal atom Oϕ ∈ S, Oϕ ∈ P iff M |= Oϕ.
We now define the notion of partition of a set of modal atoms induced by an objective sentence.
Notice that the above definition associates a maximal set of interpretations M with the sentence ϕ and the partition (P ϕ (Σ), N ϕ (Σ)).
In order to establish a characterization of OL-satisfiability based on the use of partitions of modal atoms, we prove some preliminary properties of such partitions.
Lemma 14 Let ϕ ∈ L O , let w be an interpretation, let M be a set of interpretations, and let (P, N ) be the partition induced by
Proof. Follows immediately from Definition 9 and from Definition 2. 2
Proof. Follows immediately from Definition 2. 2
by the empty set of interpretations is such that ob(P ) is unsatisfiable.
Proof. Suppose Σ is K45-satisfiable and KD45-unsatisfiable, and let (w, M ) be a K45 model such that (w, M ) |= Σ. Then, M = ∅. Let (P, N ) be the partition of M A(Σ) induced by M : since M = ∅, it follows that P = M A(Σ) (each sentence of the form Kϕ is trivially satisfied by M ). Now let M = {w : w |= ob(P )}. We prove that (P, N ) = (P ob(P ) (Σ), N ob(P ) (Σ)). The proof is by induction on the modal depth of the sentences in M A(Σ). First, let Kϕ be a modal atom of M A(Σ) such that ϕ ∈ L. Then, since Kϕ ∈ P , Definition 10 implies that ob(P ) ⊃ ϕ is a valid objective sentence, hence Kϕ ∈ P ob(P ) (Σ). Suppose now that (P, N ) and (P ob(P ) (Σ), N ob(P ) (Σ)) agree on all modal atoms of modal depth less or equal to i. Consider a modal atom Kϕ of M A(Σ) of modal depth i + 1. Again, since Kϕ ∈ P , by Definition 10 it follows that ob(P ) ⊃ ϕ| P,N is a valid objective sentence, hence M |= ϕ| P,N , and since by Definition 9 the value of the sentence ϕ| P,N only depends on the value of the modal atoms of modal depth less or equal to i in (P, N ), by the induction hypothesis and Lemma 14 it follows that M |= ϕ, hence Kϕ ∈ P ob(P ) (Σ). Consequently, (P, N ) = (P ob(P ) (Σ), N ob(P ) (Σ)), which in turn implies that Σ| P,N = Σ| P ob(P ) (Σ),N ob(P ) (Σ) . Now, since (w, M ) |= Σ, by Lemma 14 w |= Σ| P,N , hence w |= Σ| P ob(P ) (Σ),N ob(P ) (Σ) and, by the same lemma, (w, M ) |= Σ. Since M = {w : w |= ob(P )} and Σ is KD45-unsatisfiable, it follows that M is empty, hence ob(P ) is unsatisfiable. 2
We say that a sentence ϕ ∈ L O has modal depth i if each occurrence of an objective sentence in ϕ lies within the scope of at most i modalities, and there is an occurrence of an objective sentence in ϕ which lies within the scope of exactly i modalities. 
Proof. The proof is by induction on the structure of the sentences in M A(Σ). First, from the fact that (P ϕ (Σ), N ϕ (Σ)) is the partition induced by M = {w : w |= ϕ}, and from Definition 2, it follows that, if ψ ∈ L, then M |= Kψ if and only if ϕ ⊃ ψ is a valid objective sentence, and M |= Oψ if and only if ϕ ≡ ψ is a valid objective sentence. Therefore, (P, N ) agrees with (P ϕ (Σ), N ϕ (Σ)) on all modal atoms of modal depth 1. Suppose now that (P, N ) and (P ϕ (Σ), N ϕ (Σ)) agree on all modal atoms of modal depth less or equal to i. Consider a modal atom Kψ of M A(Σ) of modal depth i + 1. From Lemma 15 it follows that M |= Kψ if and only if ϕ ⊃ ψ| Pϕ(Σ),Nϕ(Σ) is a valid objective sentence, and since by Definition 9 the value of the sentence ψ| Pϕ(Σ),Nϕ(Σ) only depends on the guess of the modal atoms of modal depth less or equal to i in (P ϕ (Σ), N ϕ (Σ)), by the induction hypothesis it follows that ψ| P ϕ (Σ),N ϕ (Σ) = ψ| P,N , hence Kψ belongs to P if and only if it belongs to P ϕ (Σ). Analogously, it can be proven that any modal atom of depth i + 1 of the form Oψ belongs to P if and only if it belongs to P ϕ (Σ). Therefore, (P, N ) and (P ϕ (Σ), N ϕ (Σ)) agree on all modal atoms of modal depth i + 1. We are now ready to provide a characterization of the notion of satisfiability in OL, based on the existence of a partition (P, N ) of M A(Σ) which satisfies the property (P, N ) = (P ob(P ) (Σ), N ob(P ) (Σ)). 
Proof. If part. Suppose that either condition (a) or condition (b) of the theorem holds. Then, there are two possible cases: implies that (w, M ) satisfies Σ. Since M is maximal, it follows that Σ is OL-satisfiable; (ii) there exists a partition (P, N ) of M A(Σ) such that Σ| P,N is satisfiable and (P, N ) = (P ob(P ) (Σ), N ob(P ) (Σ)). Now, since Σ| P,N is satisfiable, there exists an interpretation satisfying Σ| P,N . Let w be such an interpretation, and let M = {w : w |= ob(P )}. Since (P, N ) = (P ob(P ) (Σ), N ob(P ) (Σ)), it follows that (P, N ) is the partition of M A(Σ) induced by M . Therefore, since w satisfies Σ| P,N , from Lemma 14 it follows that (w, M ) |= Σ. Moreover, M is maximal by construction, hence Σ is OL-satisfiable. Intuitively, the above theorem provides for a characterization of the notion of OL-satisfiability of a formula Σ in terms of properties of partitions of the modal atoms of Σ. Specifically, the theorem states that a formula Σ ∈ L O is OL-satisfiable iff either Σ[O/false] is KD45-satisfiable, which informally corresponds to checking whether it is consistent to assume as false every O-sentence occurring in Σ, or there exists a partition (P, N ) of M A(Σ) such that Σ| P,N is satisfiable and (P, N ) = (P ob(P ) (Σ), N ob(P ) (Σ)), which corresponds to checking whether there exists a guess of the modal atoms of Σ which is both consistent with Σ and not self-contradictory.
From the above theorem, it is easy to prove that the two notions of OLsatisfiability and weak OL-satisfiability coincide in the case of formulas from
Proof. Follows immediately from the fact that the proof of the only-if part of Theorem 18 holds even if the assumption that M is maximal is discarded, since such an assumption is not used in the proof. This in turn implies that Σ is weakly OL-satisfiable iff conditions (a) and (b) of Theorem 18 hold. Thus, from the same theorem, it follows that Σ is weakly OL-satisfiable iff Σ is OL-satisfiable. 2
A property analogous to the above theorem has been proved in [8] for the propositional fragment of OL.
Reasoning in OL
In this section we study reasoning in OL. In particular, we first show that extending a decidable fragment of first-order logic with only knowing preserves decidability of reasoning. Then, we establish an upper bound for the satisfiability problem in the propositional fragment of OL, and finally analyze a restriction of the propositional case in which reasoning is computationally easier.
We briefly introduce the complexity classes mentioned in the following (refer e.g. to [11] for further details). All the classes we use reside in the polynomial hierarchy. In particular, the complexity class Σ 
Reasoning method
As for effective methods for reasoning in OL, we recall that OL-satisfiability in unrestricted L O is not a decidable problem, since establishing OL-satisfiability of objective sentences corresponds to solving the satisfiability problem for full first-order logic. However, the characterization provided by Theorem 18 allows for the definition of an algorithm for reasoning in subsets of L O built upon decidable fragments of first-order logic. In the following, we say that a language L ⊆ L is closed under boolean composition if, for each ϕ 1 , ϕ 2 ∈ L , ϕ 1 ∧ϕ 2 ∈ L and ¬ϕ 1 ∈ L . Moreover, we denote as L O the subset of L O built upon L , i.e., the modal extension of L obtained according to Definition 1.
To the aim of identifying decidable fragments of L O , we prove the following lemma.
Lemma 20 Let Σ ∈ L K . Then, Σ is KD45-satisfiable iff there exists a partition (P, N ) of M A(Σ) such that:
(a) Σ| P,N is satisfiable; (b) for each Kϕ ∈ N , ob(P ) ∧ ¬ϕ| P,N is satisfiable; (c) ob(P ) is satisfiable.
Proof. If part. Let (P, N ) be a partition of M A(Σ) satisfying conditions (a), (b), and (c) of the theorem, and let M = {w : w |= ob(P )}. Condition (c) implies M = ∅. Moreover, since Σ| P,N is satisfiable, there exists an interpretation w such that w |= Σ| P,N . Now we prove, by induction on the modal depth of the modal atoms in M A(Σ), that (P, N ) = (P ob(P ) (Σ), N ob(P ) (Σ)). First, from Lemma 15 and condition (b), it follows that each modal atom Kϕ in N of modal depth 1 (i.e. such that ϕ ∈ L) also belongs to N ob(P ) (Σ); moreover, Definition 10 and Lemma 15 imply that each modal atom Kϕ in P of modal depth 1 belongs to P ob(P ) (Σ). Now suppose that (P, N ) and (P ob(P ) (Σ), N ob(P ) (Σ)) agree on all modal atoms of modal depth less or equal to i. Consider a modal atom Kϕ of M A(Σ) of modal depth i + 1. Since by Definition 9 the value of the sentence ϕ| P,N only depends on the value of the modal atoms of modal depth less or equal to i in (P, N ), by the induction hypothesis it follows that ϕ| P,N = ϕ| P ob(P ) (Σ),N ob(P ) (Σ) , hence condition (b) and Lemma 15 imply that, if Kϕ ∈ N , then Kϕ ∈ N ob(P ) (Σ), while Definition 10 and Lemma 15 imply that, if Kϕ ∈ P , then Kϕ ∈ P ob(P ) (Σ). Therefore, (P, N ) = (P ob(P ) (Σ), N ob(P ) (Σ)), and since w |= Σ| P,N and (P ob(P ) (Σ), N ob(P ) (Σ)) is the partition of M A(Σ) induced by M , from Lemma 14 it follows that (w, M ) |= Σ, which proves that Σ is KD45-satisfiable.
Only-if part. Suppose Σ is KD45-satisfiable. Then, there exists a model (w, M ) such that (w, M ) |= Σ and M = ∅. Let (P, N ) be the partition of M A(Σ) induced by M . Then, from Lemma 14 it follows that w |= Σ| P,N , hence condition (a) holds. We now prove, by induction on the modal depth of the modal atoms in M A(Σ), that (P, N ) = (P ob(P ) (Σ), N ob(P ) (Σ)). Let M = {w : w |= ob(P )}. First, by Definition 10 it follows that, for each Kϕ ∈ M A(Σ) such that ϕ ∈ L, M |= Kϕ iff M |= Kϕ, hence Kϕ ∈ P iff Kϕ ∈ P ob(P ) (Σ). Now suppose that (P, N ) and (P ob(P ) (Σ), N ob(P ) (Σ)) agree on all modal atoms of modal depth less or equal to i. Consider a modal atom Kϕ of M A(Σ) of modal depth i+1. Since Kϕ ∈ P , by Definition 10 it follows that ob(P ) ⊃ ϕ| P,N is a valid objective sentence, hence M |= ϕ| P,N , and since by Definition 9 the value of the sentence ϕ| P,N only depends on the value of the modal atoms of modal depth less or equal to i in (P, N ), by the induction hypothesis and Lemma 14 it follows that M |= ϕ, hence Kϕ ∈ P ob(P ) (Σ). Consequently, (P, N ) = (P ob(P ) (Σ), N ob(P ) (Σ)), and by Lemma 15 it follows that condition (b) holds. Finally, since M = ∅, it follows that ob(P ) is satisfiable, hence condition (c) holds. 2
We are now ready to prove decidability of OL-satisfiability for subsets of L O built upon decidable subsets of the first-order language L. 
closed under boolean composition, it follows that, for each Kϕ ∈ N , ob(P ) ∧ ¬ϕ| P,N ∈ L , hence this check is decidable; (c) ob(P ) is satisfiable. Again, since ob(P ) ∈ L , this check is decidable.
(ii) Verifying the existence of a partition (P, N ) of M A(Σ) such that Σ| P,N is satisfiable and (P, N ) = (P ob(P ) (Σ), N ob(P ) (Σ)). Again, since L is closed under boolean composition, Σ| P,N ∈ L , hence verifying satisfiability of Σ| P,N is decidable. Moreover, since L is closed under boolean composition, and since satisfiability in L is decidable, Lemma 17 provides an effective method to build the partition (P ob(P ) (Σ), N ob(P ) (Σ)) in a finite amount of time, hence checking whether (P ob(P ) (Σ), N ob(P ) (Σ)) is equal to (P, N ) is decidable. 2 Therefore, the above theorem states that reasoning about only knowing in the modal extension (without quantifying-in) of a decidable fragment of first-order logic closed under boolean composition is decidable.
In Figure 1 we present the algorithm OL-Sat for computing satisfiability in any fragment L O of L O satisfying the conditions of Theorem 21. The algorithm is based on Theorem 18, and relies on both Lemma 20, which provides a method for computing KD45-satisfiability in L K by using a procedure for computing satisfiability in L , and Lemma 17, which provides a constructive way to build the partition (P ϕ (Σ), N ϕ (Σ)) starting from the sentences Σ and ϕ, again using a procedure for satisfiability in L . Therefore, the algorithm Informally, the algorithm first checks whether it is possible to satisfy Σ by assuming as false all O-sentences occurring in Σ, that is, by making no closure assumptions about what is known. If in this way it is not possible to satisfy Σ, that is, the sentence Σ[O/false] is not KD45-satisfiable, then the algorithm checks whether there exists a partition (P, N ) of M A(Σ) satisfying certain conditions. Intuitively, the partition must be consistent with Σ (condition (a)) and cannot be self-contradictory (condition (b)). In particular, the condition (P, N ) = (P ob(P ) (Σ), N ob(P ) (Σ)) establishes that the objective knowledge implied by the partition (P, N ) (that is, the sentence ob(P )) identifies a set of interpretations which induces the same partition (P, N ) on M A(Σ). We illustrate the algorithm through the following simple example.
Example 22 Let us consider the sentence Σ defined in Example 11. Then,
As shown in Example 11, Σ| P,N = a, hence (P, N ) satisfies condition (a) of the algorithm. Now, since ob(P ) = ¬a, and (¬a ∨ Kb)| P,N = ¬a, it follows that O(¬a ∨ Kb) ∈ P ob(P ) (Σ). Moreover, the objective sentence ¬a ⊃ b is not valid, hence Kb ∈ N ob(P ) (Σ). Therefore, (P, N ) = (P ob(P ) (Σ), N ob(P ) (Σ)), i.e. condition (b) of the algorithm is satisfied. Consequently, OL-Sat(Σ) returns true. In fact, the partition (P, N ) identifies the set of interpretations M = {w : w |= ¬a}. Moreover, since Σ| P,N is satisfiable, it follows that there exists an interpretation w satisfying Σ| P,N , which implies that (w, M ) |= Σ.
AEL is a formula belonging to the propositional fragment of
where Cn is the logical consequence operator of propositional logic. The last two lemmas imply the following property.
The previous theorem implies that validity in propositional OL is Π p 2 -complete, and that the logical implication problem ϕ |= OL ψ is Π p 2 -complete as well (with respect to the size of ϕ ∧ ψ). Consequently, the algorithm OL-Sat is "optimal" with respect to the complexity of satisfiability in propositional OL, in the sense that it matches the lower bound of the problem.
Propositional case: restrictions
We now define an interesting subset of propositional OL in which the modality O can be used in a restricted way. We prove that reasoning in such a fragment of OL is easier than in the general propositional case.
First, from Lemma 25 it follows that if we impose no restrictions on formulas which lie within the scope of the operator O, then OL-satisfiability is a Σ p 2 -hard problem. Hence, in order to find a fragment of L p O for which satisfiability is computationally easier, we need to impose some restrictions on the structure of O-subformulas.
The first significant restriction corresponds to the case of formulas of the form
Satisfiability of this kind of formulas in OL is analogous to a reasoning problem which has been analyzed in several different settings (e.g. [18, 23, 5] ), and corresponds to posing an epistemic query ψ ∈ L p K to the propositional knowledge base ϕ, interpreting queries under the following intuitive epistemic closure assumption:
-for any ξ ∈ L p , if ξ is logically implied (in propositional logic) by ϕ then Kξ is implied by ϕ, otherwise ¬Kξ is implied by ϕ; -the interpretation of an epistemic query ψ with nested occurrences of the modal operator is obtained by iteratively checking all modal subformulas Kξ such that ξ ∈ L p , then substituting all such subformulas with true or false in ψ accordingly, thus obtaining new modal subformulas in ψ without nested occurrences of the modality; when all modal subformulas in ψ have been replaced in this way, it can be checked whether ψ is implied by ϕ.
It can be shown (see [18, Corollary 3.13] ) that Oϕ ∧ ¬Kψ is satisfiable if and only if ψ is not implied by ϕ under the above semantics for epistemic queries. Moreover, it is known that the problem is P
NP
[O(log n)]-complete [6] , that is, it can be solved in polynomial time through a number of calls to the NP-oracle which is logarithmic in the size of the formula ϕ ∧ ψ. Therefore, satisfiability in OL of a formula of the form
We now define a large superclass of the above set of formulas, and show that satisfiability in OL for such kind of formulas is still easier than in the general case. 
Notice that the only restriction imposed by the above definition is on the form of O-subformulas: roughly speaking, in each O-subformula ϕ it must be possible to isolate an "objective" (i.e. belonging to L p ) and a "subjective" The language L − O allows for a nice formalization of a generalization of the above mentioned setting of epistemic queries, in which one can express queries regarding the epistemic state of a number (say n) of propositional knowledge bases. A multimodal language with n operators K 1 , . . . , K n can be used for expressing the epistemic state of each of the knowledge bases. Given a set of n propositional knowledge bases K = {KB 1 , . . . , KB n }, in which each KB i is a formula from L p , we define an epistemic query to K as a boolean combination of epistemic queries to the single knowledge bases. E.g., we can pose a query of the form
such that ϕ is an epistemic query to KB 1 (i.e. in which the only modality K 1 is used), ψ is an epistemic query to KB 2 , and ξ is an epistemic query to KB 3 . Q is implied by K if and only if ϕ is implied by KB 1 and either ψ is not implied by KB 2 or ξ is implied by KB 3 .
It is immediate to see that the evaluation of such forms of epistemic queries can be reduced to checking validity of formulas in L − O . In the case of the above example, Q is implied by K iff the formula
is OL-valid, where ϕ is obtained from ϕ by substituting each occurrence of K 1 with K, and ψ , ξ are obtained in a similar way from ψ and ξ.
We now prove that OL-satisfiability for a formula Σ belonging to L Correctness of the algorithm is established by the following theorem. [O(log n)]-complete, namely it can be computed in polynomial time by a logarithmic (in the size of Σ) number of calls to an NP-oracle. To this aim, we recall the decision problem TREES(SAT) and the notion of NP-tree [6] . An NP-tree is a triple V ar, G, R in which:
Example 28 Let us again consider the formula
-V ar is a set of propositional variables v 1 , . . . , v n (called the linking variables); -G = (V, E) is a directed tree, with edges directed from the leaves to the root.
Each element of the set of nodes V = {F 1 , . . . , F n } contains a propositional formula F i built upon a set of private propositional symbols (i.e., symbols which do not appear in any other node) and the linking variables v j such that (F j , F i ) ∈ E; -F r is a distinguished node, called terminal node.
The truth assignment σ to the propositional variables in an NP-tree is defined as follows: σ(v i ) = TRUE iff the formula F i is satisfiable, where F i stands for for the formula obtained from Proof. Hardness follows from the aforementioned fact that satisfiability in OL of a formula of the form Oϕ∧¬Kψ such that ϕ ∈ L p , ψ ∈ L p K , corresponds to verify whether the epistemic query ψ is not implied by ϕ. In turn, this last problem corresponds (see [6] ) to check non-membership of the formula Kψ in the stable set identified by the formula ϕ, which is a P 
To this aim, we reduce, in time polynomial in the size of Σ, the problem of checking whether such a statement returns true to TREES(SAT). We construct the NP-tree T (Σ) as follows. 4 First, let m = n + 2, f n+1 = true, f n+2 = false. We start from the following tree:
Then, we obtain T (Σ) by expanding each node F i (i = 1, . . . , m) of the above tree as follows. Let F be the node F i or any successor node of F i . Now: -For each strict occurrence of a formula Kϕ in F , create a new node As mentioned in the introduction, only knowing is strictly related to the minimal knowledge principle. We now compare these two notions from the computational viewpoint.
The principle of minimal knowledge is a very general notion which can be phrased as follows: "In each possible epistemic state, the agent has minimal objective knowledge", that is, the agent has as much ignorance as possible about the current state of the world. As a consequence, there exists no epistemic state whose objective knowledge logically implies the objective knowledge of another epistemic state.
There are several proposals in the literature based on the minimal knowledge paradigm (see e.g. [9, 19, 12, 26] ). Among them, the first attempt is due to Halpern and Moses [9] and is the most similar to the notion of only knowing. Informally, Halpern and Moses apply minimal knowledge to modal logic S5: thus, they define a preference semantics [27] over S5, by considering as intended models of a modal theory Σ only those S5 models satisfying Σ in which the set of possible worlds is maximal with respect to set containment. Hence, in this case the notion of maximization lies at the semantic level.
Recently, it has been proven [2] that reasoning in Halpern and Moses' version of S5 (also known as ground nonmonotonic modal logic S5 G ) lies at the third level of the polynomial hierarchy. In particular, logical implication in S5 G is a Π p 3 -complete problem. Moreover, many other formalisms based on the minimal knowledge paradigm share the same computational properties of S5 G [3, 2, 24] . Hence, we can conclude that (unless the polynomial hierarchy collapses) minimal knowledge is computationally harder than only knowing. In particular, S5 G cannot be "polynomially embedded" into OL. This is a surprising result, since the logic of only knowing is generally considered as a very expressive formalism, due to its powerful ability of explicitly expressing minimization of knowledge.
On the other hand, it can be shown that the reason why S5 G (and more generally all logics based on S5 G ) is computationally harder than OL (and all major propositional nonmonotonic formalisms) is that S5 G allows for expressing minimal knowledge states in a more compact form than OL. See [25] for a detailed study of the epistemological properties of S5 G .
Conclusions
In this paper we have defined a general method for reasoning about only knowing based on deduction techniques developed for nonmonotonic modal logics, which proves the strict similarity between these logics and Levesque's monotonic formalism. Based on such a reasoning method, we have investigated the computational properties of the propositional fragment of Levesque's modal logic of only knowing. Our analysis shows that the problem of reasoning about only knowing in the propositional case lies at the second level of the polynomial hierarchy, just like reasoning in most of the propositional formalisms for nonmonotonic reasoning. We have also studied syntactic restrictions in which reasoning about only knowing is easier than in the general case, and have shown the connections between such a restricted setting and the framework of epistemic queries to "classical" knowledge bases [23] .
We remark that a computational analysis of reasoning about only knowing is interesting not only from a theoretical perspective, but also for the development of automated reasoning procedures in the setting of reasoning about actions, where the logic of only knowing has been recently applied [14, 16] .
One further development of the present work is towards the analysis of reasoning about only knowing in the presence of quantifying-in: in particular, it should be interesting to see whether it is possible to extend the techniques presented here for fragments of such a more expressive case. This analysis may also take advantage of recent results on reasoning with quantifying-in in standard modal logics [28] .
Furthermore, the problem of embedding only knowing into nonmonotonic formalisms (as autoepistemic logic or the logic S5 G ) is very interesting from the theoretical viewpoint, in order to establish further relationships between reasoning about only knowing and other forms of nonmonotonic reasoning.
